【主题】Information Discrimination Through Market Segmentation
【摘要】We study the welfare consequences of third-degree information discrimination. A sender persuades a receiver to take a costly action (out of two possible actions). The receiver's cost is her private information, and the sender observes a signal about this cost before disclosing information to the receiver. We map information discrimination (with two actions and linear utilities) to price discrimination with a lower bound on transfers. Market segmentation generally fails to restore efficiency, due to heterogeneous tax rates and horizontal differentiation. The receiver-optimal segmentation might strictly increase the sender's payoff relative to the initial market. Finally two byproducts of our study include ironing as concavification and public persuasion as a posted price.
【报告人简介】孟德隆，上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院助理教授，美国斯坦福大学经济学博士。主要研究领域为微观经济学，行为经济学，政治经济学。学术成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory，Journal of Mathematical Economics。